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ABSTRACT: The relationship between law enforcement and the public has recently come under scrutiny after a
number of high-profile deaths of African-Americans at the hands of police officers. The ensuing public outcry has
given way to a wide-ranging debate about the origins of such tension and why it has continued to manifest with such
vigor despite apparent progress. This research attempts to uncover the underpinnings of this tension through a historical
review of the development of the law enforcement institution and the narrative of crime in society. Specifically, this
research investigates the role of federalization and politicization on crime and its impact on the relationship between
law enforcement and the public. My findings suggest that the politicization of crime has created a false narrative that
distorts the racial and class composition of crime, unnecessarily favors use of force and confrontational contact with
the public, and compromises the integrity of crime statistics and their collection. This false narrative undermines the
core objective of law enforcement — public safety — and negatively impacts its institutional goals and mindset, the
implications of which reach beyond the police to society at large and the policies that define criminality and shape
crime control.
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INTRODUCTION
The public outcry that followed the 2014 shooting death
of Michael Brown, a young African-American man, by
a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri brought to the
forefront the issue of police violence and excessive use
of force, particularly against African-Americans. But the
issue is not a new one. A similar incident took place in
1991 when a number of Los Angeles Police Department
officers beat Rodney King1 following a traffic stop.
Though nearly a quarter of a century has passed between
the two incidents, it appears as if little has fundamentally
changed. Racism and racial tension in law enforcement
and society has been addressed by a large body of
research; however, the politicization of crime and its role
in racializing crime, as well as the impact of federalization
on crime control, has been less thoroughly scrutinized.
Owing to Scheingold (1984) and Reasons (1974),
the concept of the politicization of crime has become
more prevalent in scholarly research. In this paper, the
politicization of crime is defined as the use of the crime
issue as a political tool or construct to further policy
and political agendas. As research by Murakawa (2005)
and Lynch (2008) indicates, racialization of crime is a
consequence of politicization rather than the inverse.
Hence, we must look more closely at the politicization
of crime control, particularly in the years leading up
to and following the Civil Rights era of the 1960s,
to understand the link between politics and crime.
Federalization presents another angle of politicization.
The ever-expanding role of the federal government in
the process of crime control has had a profound effect
on how law enforcement conducts itself and the types of
crimes given the most attention.
This paper uses archival research to identify the historical
link between the federalization and politicization of crime
and its impact on the institution of law enforcement. It
is not the intention of this research to be a commentary
on racialization, but because race plays an integral role
in the operationalization and exercise of crime control
in the United States, inevitably it must be included. The
public’s understanding of crime in society has evolved
over time, and with the advent of social media and
sharing platforms, the public has become more aware of
crime beyond its political characterization. Despite this
growing awareness, there remain disparities in the public’s
perception of crime versus actual crime rates, which are
also evident in the institution of law enforcement.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol11/iss2/5

This paper proceeds in three parts. First, I overview
the State’s2 police power to better understand the role
and development of the institution of law enforcement.
Manning (1999) and Cummings (1979) provide useful
background on the evolution of police power in this
aspect, while Reiner (2010) explicates the confluence of
politics and law enforcement. Secondly, I scrutinize the
federal shift in crime control, particularly with respect
to its impact on the law enforcement institution and
how crime has been quantified and variously controlled.
The extensive research of Beckett and Sasson (2003),
Schiengold (1984), and Simon (2009) document the
evolution of crime’s politicization, as well as how the
politics of crime has impacted other aspects of society.
Simon (2009) and Surette (2006) provide further
support for the influence of politicization on the crime
narrative and the public perception of crime. Thirdly, I
analyze the crime narrative itself, taking into account the
influences addressed in the previous two sections. This
narrative is an important component of the racialization
of crime and how the public sees criminals, the agents of
crime control, and the process of remediation. Findings
by Lynch (2008) provide some of the most compelling
evidence of the evolution of the crime narrative from a
political point of view. This research will then elucidate
further the larger social effects of the politics of crime.
THE COERCIVE POWER OF THE STATE
Criminal law is the set of the codified rules and norms
of society that dictate the parameters of order, defining
what is normal and what is deviant and more broadly
constituting who is accepted and who is ostracized.
When individuals deviate from the publicly and sociallyaccepted conception of order and normalcy they become
criminals, having broken one or more of those codified
rules and norms. Society’s perception of rules and norms
are not static and change over time and space (Richerson,
Mulder, and Vila 2001). What is considered deviant at
a certain point in history may shift at a later time, and
what may be labelled as normal in a particular region may
be considered deviant in another. Therefore, laws also
change in response to these societal shifts because order
and peace as the objectives of the state are only made
possible by rejecting those presumed to be deviants based
on the current perception. This dialectical construction
of the relationship between law and criminality is
fundamental to understanding the changes that occur in
societal acceptance or rejection of certain behavior and
the agents that promote and enforce it.
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Though, in principle, the public defines what is socially
accepted or rejected, the ability to define deviance
belongs to the state and is a powerful exclusionary
political device (Michalowski 2000). Therefore, norms
are often the product of politics and specific interests
(Reiner 2010). When it is expedient for the state to
create new classifications of deviance, or even abolish
old ones, the public is enlisted to adopt such new
distinctions. This process empowers the state to codify
the newly recognized norms and enforce them (Reiman
1984). Because of the enormous power contained in the
social construction of crime, the potential for abuse is
considerable.
The above framework of law also grants the state its
police power— that is, its legitimate power to enforce the
law and maintain order. Maintaining order is primarily a
peacekeeping mandate, with enforcing law on the coercive
end of the spectrum (Cummings 1965; Manning 1999).
It is clear from our previous discussion on normalcy
and deviance, as it relates to the construction of crime,
that deviance is the exception: the anomaly that invokes
coercive power to control it. Order therefore only entails
the police’s peacekeeping role, arguably the central role
for any domestic law enforcement entity (Cummings
1965).
Though police power extends to coercive force, such force
is presumably limited to serving a specific, restricted
purpose: to protect the collective from the deviance
of a few. The legitimacy of this force stops when the
transgression has ceased or where its power to sanction
has been exhausted (Simon 2009). This is to say nothing
of the degree of force used or the degree of transgression
that would elicit it. The use of force is also constructed,
dependent on the context and the individual towards
whom the force is directed. The specifics regarding
reasonable use of force are beyond the scope of this paper;
however, the narratives of crime and criminality, and law
enforcement’s mandate and organizational identity, all
exert significant power over how, when, and on whom
force is used and to what degree (See Beckett and Sasson
2003; Ghandnoosh 2014; Lynch 2008; Murakawa 2005).
In 1851, Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts State
Supreme Court, writing for the majority in the landmark
case Commonwealth v. Alegro, ushered a new term into
the legal lexicon: “police power.” Shaw defines this term
as “the power vested in the legislature by the constitution,
to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinance, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution,
Published by STARS, 2020

as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same” (Horwitz
1995). Later, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), U.S.
Supreme Court Justice John Harlan would define the
limits of police power, clarifying that such a power “must
always yield in case of conflict with the exercise by the
General Government of any power it possesses under the
Constitution, or with any right which that instrument
gives or secures” (Horwitz 1995).
Given the objective of the state to promote the welfare of
its citizens and expect their cooperation and contribution,
law enforcement, generally, has been mandated to carry
out that power (Bucerius and Tonry 2014). Thus, the
police represent the coercive power of the state. As part of
the executive branch (within each level of government),
the police are inextricably linked to the state as a political
entity as much as a social, geographic, and ethno-cultural
one. This linkage is an important component of the
identity of law enforcement. The political will of the
democratic state, in theory, serves public interest, and
even when that theory is loosely followed, maintaining
order and promoting citizen welfare are essential to the
security and power of the state (Bucerius and Tonry 2014).
Therefore, the state enacts laws for the aforementioned
purposes, using its police power to enforce them.
Given the considerable potential for abuse due to the
latitude of police power, the language extending it has
sought to subordinate and narrowly define it. In both
early definitions provided by the courts, police power
was legitimated insofar as its use was “wholesome
and reasonable” and for “the good and welfare” of the
public. Further, police power was constrained where it
contravened constitutional principles or their legitimate
interpretation (Freund 1976). Ernst Freund’s seminal
work, “The Police Power,” maintains that the court must
“not accept as conclusive” the legislative perspective
of the parameters of power, “but inquire in every case
whether there is a legitimate exercise of police power”
(p. 334). Freund also clarifies the strong link between
the making of the law and its execution, suggesting
that one is not to be entirely trusted to hold the other
accountable. As we will see in the next section, the courts
have played a corrective role on many occasions where
the legislative interpretation and/or expansion of police
power overstepped its constitutional limitations and
encroached on the public’s rights.
The police, historically, operate in a local context as
well, since crime and other social issues are contextually
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related to the communities in which they occur. Different
environments, resources, and populations require different
responses to highly individualized issues. Furthermore,
the process of federalization (discussed further in the
following section) is as much a political undertaking as
it is a legislative one — the public must be in support
of such efforts for its success. After all, the American
federalist system grants great latitude to individual states
in governing their own affairs with a central government
of limited powers (Nolan et al. 2018).
It would be naïve to neglect mentioning the cronyism
and local politics that characterized many police agencies
pre-1960 (Bayley and Nixon 2010). City and county
government officials and local politicians used the police
to redress political or personal grievances extrajudicially;
favoritism, corruption, and procedural negligence were
often regular features of law enforcement. The abuse
of local police power within this context contrasts with
federal anti-crime initiatives. In any case, efforts to
professionalize police were responsive to this conflict
of interest between serving a limited group of powerful
individuals and serving public interest.
The professionalization shift resulted in more organized
and systematic law enforcement, distanced (if only by
a few degrees) from local political machinations and
characterized by greater procedural consistency (Bayley
and Nixon 2010). However, the conditions, motivations,
and political forces that propelled professionalization
also impacted its efficacy as a service organization (Gest
2001; Maguire 2003). The federalized nature of the
professional shift led to a more efficient instrument of
state power defined by control and enforcement. Though
professionalization should have pushed the police
institution towards an increasingly integrated role, it
instead became further distanced from its peacekeeping
nature and more entrenched as a protector and advocate
of state interests (Kraska and Cubellis 1997).
Given professional accreditation bodies such as the
American Medical Association (AMA) for doctors
and the American Bar Association (ABA) for lawyers,
centralization could have been accomplished through a
professional accreditation body for law enforcement, like
the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).
Such a body could provide disciplinary, professional
oversight and standards rather than a political framework.
The government would have systems for evaluation,
control, and licensure not unlike those of law and
medicine. However, the federal political system provides
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol11/iss2/5

much of the support, funding, and strategic leadership for
law enforcement at local levels, thus shifting agency away
from police organizations. This phenomenon increasingly
subordinates these organizations to federalized police
operations, i.e., the ‘War on Crime’ or the ‘War on
Drugs’. The deployment of such national initiatives with
respect to law enforcement can be especially dangerous or
problematic for a country as diverse and environmentally
variant as the United States3.
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIME CONTROL

The American political, social, and economic landscape
was in transition following the end of World War II and
the economic boom that produced an expanding middle
class. Racial and cultural tensions rose significantly as
a result of demographic changes brought on by black
veterans returning from the war and resettling in new
demographic patterns, as well as a rapidly growing
suburban America (Murakawa 2008). Americans turned
their attention to domestic areas of concern and issues
of social justice and political transformation. The U.S.
Supreme Court, reflecting changing public sentiment,
was at the forefront with a series of decisions that tore
down decades of precedent, including the separate but
equal4 doctrine, the end of de jure segregation5, and the
expansion of due process rights for criminal suspects6.
As Simon (2009) indicates, it was in the beginning of
the sixties that the civil rights movement increased in
strength and scope. As a result, lawmakers and politicians
sought to change the narrative of crime to take on the
protest movements and civil rights advocates who had
also become increasingly politically active.
For Southern lawmakers in particular, this narrative
meant generalizing crime as categorically related to
particular ‘deviant’ groups (African Americans) rather
than a consequence of individual behavior (Lynch 2008;
Simon 2009).
This approach took on national prominence during the
Johnson administration when the anti-Vietnam War
movement, which drove major political demonstrations,
transformed crime from an individual or group
behavioral problem to a matter of patriotism and national
security, both highly political distinctions (Beckett and
Sasson 2004). Anti-war demonstrators, elements of the
political order contended, were a threat to the public
order through their disruptive action, compromising
national security through their defiance of the State
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and threatening others’ peace and security for their own
interests (Rising 2010). By addressing public grievances
against the government through crime, political dissent
could be better managed. Dissenters were dismissed as
criminals, deviants, and subversives (Churchill and Wall
1990). This shift in the narrative of crime and the profile
of the ‘criminal’ was instrumental in influencing the
management of criminal behavior.
Framing crime as a national security concern changed
the type of power that could be brought to bear on the
problem. Up until this point, crime remained relatively
confined to state and local authority. Federal interest in
manipulating the crime narrative, framed by J. Edgar
Hoover’s FBI, lacked the means or the structure to
systematically implement centralized enforcement (Gest
2003). That circumstance changed with the passing of
the Omnibus Criminal Control and Safe Streets Act
(OCCA), signed by President Johnson in 1968 (Simon
2009). This expansive legislation included a number of
civil rights-oriented provisions, chief among them the
creation of the first criminal justice database for law
enforcement (LEAA), which collated data for criminal
justice research focused on social aspects of crime
(Bucerius and Tonry 2014).
The OCCA shifted aspects of crime control to the
federal government, providing increasingly centralized
organization and structure (Simon 2009). This
centralization was accomplished mainly through
millions of dollars in block grants to law enforcement,
giving the federal government increased influence on
police activities within states and even local jurisdictions
(Simon 2009). Thereafter, the OCCA continued to
expand, and numerous other federal laws, of equal or
greater consequence, followed (Beckett 1997).
When considered within the historical context of the
civil rights movement and the social justice revolution of
the 1960’s and 1970’s, the significance of centralization
becomes clearer still. American society was undergoing
profound changes, confronting issues of segregation,
diversity, and individual rights. The public became
increasingly exposed to episodes of police violence and
the racial dichotomy of tensions, mainly between white
perpetrators and black victims (Surette 2006). Activists
demanded the political system address clear injustices
and take a more active role in redressing the grievances
of the victims (mostly African Americans). The public
and the courts arrived at conclusions which were often at
odds with the entrenched political interests of the federal
Published by STARS, 2020

and legislative branches (Kamisar 2000).
Certain political groups found it crucial to control where
the public located the problem and what individual or
institution they found responsible. Compiling Gallup
opinion polling data from 1965 to 1980, Scheingold
(1984) demonstrates that when presented with openended surveys about the most important issue facing
the country, Americans consistently ranked issues other
than crime as most pressing. With the exception of
1968-9, and ’73, the percentage of Americans ranking
crime as a critical issue was below 10 percentage points
(See Appendix, Table 1).
This fact indicates that, despite an increasing crime
rate, the public was still relatively undaunted by this
phenomenon or its consequences significantly. However,
when asked using a different survey employing forced
choice questions7, participants consistently ranked
crime as the highest priority issue for the same survey
years compared to other topics (See Appendix, Table 2).
Scheingold (1984) suggests that this statistical contrast
indicates that crime in public perception is “latent
rather than active,” pointing to a “powerful current of
suggestibility” (43-4). These findings are consistent
with Beckett and Sasson (2007) who demonstrate that
public perception and fear of crime is “top-down” (120),
initiated by political agitation and media coverage. By
comparison, respondents to open-ended surveys for the
same time period listed issues relating to civil rights,
the Vietnam War, and nuclear arms as more significant
(Scheingold 1984).
Beckett and Sasson (2007) and Scheingold (1984)
look more closely at another indicator of public crime
perception: fear of walking alone at night. With the
exception of a significant increase between 1972 and
1975, response trends in both data analyses show that
rates have remained notably stable over time, declining in
the past decade. This trend sharply contrasts with crime
policy initiatives, which have steadily grown in number
(Beckett and Sasson 2007). Scheingold (1984) also
shows that elevated negative responses to “fear of walking
alone at night” surveys are better understood by breaking
down the data to show the categories of respondents
most expressive of that sentiment, specifically women
and minorities in urban areas. In each case, the existing
“current of suggestibility” creates an opportunity to direct
public opinion independent of actual crime numbers.
Despite increased public awareness, recent polling
demonstrates this divergence, where the public assumes
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that crime rates are rising despite statistical evidence
to the contrary (see Figure 1). This particular dataset is
instrumental to understanding the categories of crime
that impact public perception strongest, and therefore,
are the most politically expedient.
The disparities in public concern over crime and the
political focus on crime were also reflected in civil rights
era court decisions. The Warren Court, named after
Chief Justice Earl Warren, ushered in what is commonly
referred to as the “due process revolution,” starting in
1961 with the Court’s landmark decision to disallow
evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure
in Mapp v. Ohio (Kamisar 2000). The Court’s other
landmark decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, Gideon v.
Wainwright, Terry v. Ohio, and Beck v. Ohio, among
others, reinforced defendants’ constitutional rights and
created better defined and enforced rules of criminal
procedure (Pye 1968). These decisions also limited the
near impunity law enforcement had grown accustomed
to of violating defendants’ rights (Pye 1968). The impact
and significance of the due process decisions by the court
cannot be overstated; to this day, they incite conservative
condemnation on the undermining of law and justice
(Rising 2010).
Of course, these decisions were responsive to the social
and civil rights revolutions, noted above, that at once
demanded and facilitated such decisions. Quoting
McCloskey, Pye (1968) notes, “The Warren Court’s
espousal of civil rights was less a matter of deliberate
choice than of a predictable response to the wave of

history,” adding, “It may be forcefully argued that the
increased concern of the Supreme Court in matters of
criminal justice was almost inevitable” (256). The Warren
Court’s most notable decisions had not overturned
precedent either, as some had suggested — many were,
in fact, broader reiterations of decisions made years prior
—however, they provided sharp rebukes of violations of
individual rights by law enforcement within the broader
context of the rights revolution (Pye 1968). To some
political interests at the time, that was a particularly
acrimonious confluence.
Concurrently, the national crime rate was rising
significantly. Over the decade, the national crime rate
more than doubled from nearly 3.4 million incidents in
1960 to 7.4 million in 1970 (Uniform Crime Reports,
United States). A wealth of scholarship indicates that the
incredible social, economic, and foreign policy upheaval
of the time, including the Vietnam and Cold Wars, the
civil unrest resulting from public dissent, and the recent
assassination of a very popular president (President John
F. Kennedy), were at the root of this surge in criminal
activity (See Ciment 2015; National Research Council
2014; Rising 2010). There is also some credence to the
theory, put forth by Eterno (2007), that law enforcement
lacked adequate coping strategies to efficiently implement
the new legal requirements. Those deficiencies also may
have contributed to some degree of attrition within
the police force, impacting the crime rate. However,
conservative lawmakers were quick to associate this trend
with the “handcuffing of the police” by the liberal Warren
Court, and the “coddling of criminals” (Rising 2010).

Figure 1. Source: Gallup Crime Perception Survey ( Jones and Saad 2014)
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol11/iss2/5
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These lawmakers stoked racial resentment to associate
criminality and disorder with the civil rights movement,
smearing “liberal” policies that supposedly condoned it.
Never before were the mechanisms of the justice system,
or academics and public figures so politically assailed and
subjected to calls for reform and/or expulsion for their
stances on crime (National Research Council 2014).
Conservative and white segregationist anger against
the Court, stemming from its anti-segregation, antidiscrimination, and socially reformist decisions well
before 1961, found a new focal point for admonition:
crime and law enforcement (Rising 2010). This
particular event signaled an important shift in public
policy initiatives, from civil rights to criminal justice.
Nowhere was the shift more evident than in the 1964
presidential election, when Republican senator Barry
Goldwater challenged President Johnson’s “Great
Society” initiatives with a “law and order” platform that
promised to “not support or invite any American to seek
redress… through lawlessness, violence, and hurt of his
fellow man or damage of his property” (Beckett and
Sasson 2007, 50). Goldwater, as the National Research
Council report finds, used “explicit and implicit racebased denunciations of the civil rights movement” to
gain white votes (2014, 108). Though crime was indeed
rising at a significant rate, the statistical incongruities
between the public’s concerns related to crime and its
perception, noted by Schiengold (1984), are indicative of
the capacity to manipulate public response.
In a clear demonstration of the public’s lack of “outrage”
towards the crime issue, Goldwater lost his bid
spectacularly to Johnson, but crime had now become
front and center in the political arena. Conservative
lawmakers, having lost both houses of Congress, were
eager to stoke this trend (Beckett and Sasson, 2007).
Ted Gest (2001), who conducted interviews with over
100 officials and congressmen for his book Crime and
Politics, quotes then-DOJ crime research chief Gerald
Caplan: “It was understood that the effect of Senator
Goldwater’s lopsided defeat was not to bury crime as an
issue, but merely to transfer the official responsibility to
the democratic administration” (6).
Soon thereafter, President Johnson declared a “war
on crime”, creating the Office of Law Enforcement
Assistance (OLEA), appointing a national crime
commission, and pushing through Congress the Law
Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA), all of which
radically federalized the administration of criminal
Published by STARS, 2020

justice and opened an ever-increasing war chest of
federal funds to state and local law enforcement (Beckett
and Sasson 2007; Simon 2009; Lee 2007). Despite the
pressure, Johnson attempted to take a social science
and research-based approach to the examination and
remediation of the crime problem, creating federal
databases to track law enforcement action and crime
incidence and apportioning funding to rehabilitation
programs and other social development (Lee 2007).
The President’s Crime Commission conducted
research, surveys, and interviews, involving thousands
of participants and experts, in an attempt to produce a
bipartisan and comprehensive report (Gest 2001). The
commission’s contribution to the development of research,
professionalization, and public understanding of the
criminal justice process cannot be understated, with over
200 recommendations in the final report. However, this
huge undertaking proved too big for its own good. The
commission’s work was plagued with political infighting
and came into conflict with other parts of the federal
system, most notably J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI (Gest 2001).
As a result, the most important parts of the report went
largely unnoticed.
The migration of the crime issue across party lines would
have a lasting effect on the politics of criminal justice
policy across administrations, hindering or altogether
muting voices that questioned “get tough” policies (Lee
2007). The passage of the OCCA in 1968, meant to be
the legislative product of the Commission report, was a
radical reversal from the Great Society underpinnings of
previous crime related initiatives, directly undermining
some of the Supreme Court’s most significant due
process decisions (Kamisar 2000). Now, the ‘war on crime’
fronted all sorts of political finagling, from suppression of
public dissent to de jure discrimination and segregation
to score settling with the judiciary (Rising 2010).
The crime narrative’s success in redirecting the civil
rights campaign and transferring greater control to the
state over its subjects, in a particularly punitive sense, led
to its eventual evolution (Lerman and Weaver 2010).
Despite the unprecedented expansion of the federal
role in law enforcement regulation, the scope of federal
control was still limited, particularly in relation to street
crime. The main thrust of federal control remained
through funding, where the allocation of funds would be
contingent on state and local cooperation in addition to
implementation of federally recommended or provided
standards. This barrier to further federal expansion in
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the area of law enforcement led to the next great shift
in the political construction of crime: the war on drugs.
Unlike violent crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery,
drug offenses fell under federal jurisdiction, providing
much greater latitude to the federal government in
crime control (Simon 2009). Shortly after the election of
President Richard Nixon, the shift in drug control policy
as a focal point of the war on crime began to take shape.
By increasing the political visibility of crime and linking
it with drug abuse, President Nixon increased the drug
enforcement budget more than ten-fold, from $65
million to $719 million, and the LEAA budget by over
500%, from $65 million to over $500 million (Beckett
and Sasson 2007). These staggering expansions of the
government’s law enforcement resources were only
possible through the powerful political drive of the crime
narrative, which tapped into the public’s underlying
concern about issues of personal security (Scheingold
1984). President Nixon may have been more vocal
and unabashed in brandishing crime and punishment;
however, his successors would continue to use this
narrative to similar effect in the decades to follow.
THE NARRATIVE OF CRIME
Eminent in the conversation on crime policy changes
and implementation is the greater narrative of crime
within society — its agents and actors. As with most
publicly accepted narratives, the narrative of crime
foregrounds all other events related to crime; it shapes
and influences the way the public responds to it, the
government deals with it, and society acclimates to it.
We already discussed public receptivity and reactiveness
to matters that concern personal security, emphasizing
the high rate of suggestibility in such topics. Through the
deployment of powerful, persuasive narratives such as
patriotism, national identity, personal security, and chaos,
political and media-based rhetoric reshaped the narrative
of crime for political expedience. Just as the President
uses carefully chosen words to reinforce particular
policy objectives, his words help construct the societal
narrative surrounding crime. Lynch (2008) chronicles a
fundamental shift in this narrative coinciding, naturally,
with the shift in policy starting in the early 1960’s and
again in the 1980s, with the advent of the “war on drugs.”
This shift in the definition and image of the “typical
criminal” was also highly racialized, reflecting the
political upheaval of the time. Lynch’s research provides
the clearest evidence of the interlocking of public policy
and the shift in narrative.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol11/iss2/5

Lynch (2008) describes three distinct typifications of
“the typical penal subject:” an 1) old penal subject, a 2)
transitional penal subject, and a 3) new penal subject
(Lynch 2008, 90-4).
Accompanying these individual characterizations is a
characterization of the system needed to accomplish the
goals of rehabilitation, containment, or eradication of
the “penal subject” in question. The “old penal subject,”
pre-dating the 1960s, was characterized as “a reformable
being,” someone “who needed to be known and
understood,” using Garland’s term “penal-welfarism” to
describe the systemic ideology approaching the criminal
subject (Lynch 2008, 90). These presumptions about the
role of the criminal and the state served to develop the
institutions of the latter not as a permanent destination
where individuals are cast away, but an interventional
stage that only in extremely rare cases would dispose of
its subjects. Lynch (2008) describes this relationship:
Thus, the criminal/penal subject merely deviated
on one or more scales from an idealized norm,
rather than belonging in a quantitatively different
category of being. And since the penal subject’s
offending behavior or deviant acts fell within a
continuum of human behavior, this conception of
the penal subject held the potential for productive
change and was generally viewed as worthy of
state efforts to impel that change (90-1).
Key to this conception is that crime was fundamentally a
treatment problem that required a level of expertise within
the system, an expectation of reformation and conditional
improvement, and a need to address conditions external
to the “criminal” (Lynch 2008). What proceeded that
understanding was a sea change in the conception and
representation of the criminal or “the penal subject.”
Lynch (2008) notes the competing theories emerging
regarding crime and the state’s role in intervention borne
out of the rehabilitative policies and assumptions of the
Johnson administration and his Crime Commission.
She also highlights the ultimate success of the largely
political narrative that distinguished the criminal from
the average individual. Citing an earlier study by Beckett,
Lynch (2008) references the use of “law and order”
rhetoric to shift the public conceptualization of crime
and criminals: “This political tactic, then, helped shape a
new construction of the penal subject as one who… was
a much more significant threat to the nation’s well-being
than previously conceived” (92).
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Even more essential was the racial shift that occurred in
the portrayal of the penal subject, which Lynch (2008)
documents closely through her research into correctional
advertising and communication over a fifty-year period.
This racial shift occurred over two phases, in the
transitional period of the 1960s and 70s first: “a more
violent… more irrational, and less redeemable African
American convict” that joined the former (inevitably
male) “weak but redeemable white inmate,” and later:
“a wholly irredeemable ‘other,’ primarily identified as
African American, who is best incarcerated to protect
society” (93).
Comparatively, the first subject, the white inmate, fit
the treatment model: smaller than his handlers, perhaps
“sickly,” being led, and the second subject, the darkerskinned inmate, fit the threat model, “a bulky, muscled
figure” with a “surly or menacing facial expression,”
attempting to break loose (Lynch 2008, 93). This
shift reflects the emerging political narrative of crime
as an essential threat that needed to be eradicated,
crushed, or suppressed, but never treated or studied.
The racially framed “irredeemability” allows also for the
delegitimization of the concerns and complaints of these
individuals and elevates their magnitude of threat.
The transitional period did not last very long, as the
latter image of the criminal became standardized and
shifted, perhaps further, towards an even less relatable
or redeemable ‘other’. Therefore, the new penal subject
was an evolved version of his transitional counterpart:
“The imagined prototypical offender in popular, political,
and even justice policy circles tended to be the scariest
(although statistically rarest) type of criminal, who need
not be understood or corrected but who must at any cost
be contained and disempowered” (Lynch 2008, 94).
This new conceptualization of ‘the criminal’ was thus
more simplistic and less complex, placing greater (if not
all) onus on the individual and therefore an inherent
defect in their being. Though correctional institutions
still retained their distinction as being ‘correctional,’ they
acted more like clearing houses and containment centers
than places where one might actually expect ‘corrective’
measures. Eventually, this characterization of the
criminal evolved further, drifting far from its health and
social beginnings to the “super predator” of the 1990s
(National Research Council 2014). In the interim, the
penal system was expanding rapidly, cementing its role as
a repository for “undesirables” that had no other means
of redress. The common narrative on crime allowed
Published by STARS, 2020

criminals to grow more and more distant from ‘normal’
members of society and therefore easily discounted and
shunned as having “chosen” a path of self-destruction,
rather than being potential victims of a system that fails
to create opportunities for recovery. Other categories of
individuals, such as immigrants and religious or ethnic
minorities, who on occasion would find themselves
the subject of political vilification, would face similarly
punitive treatment (Lynch 2008).
On an organizational level, the political conversation on
crime that undergirded the shift in the portrayal of the
common criminal was fueled by Southern policymakers
threatened by the prospect of integration and the end
of Jim Crow during the civil rights era. Stoking white
fears of integration, local governments in the South
published erroneous “crime reports” and laid blame
on social programs for harboring and even nurturing
criminality (Lerman and Weaver 2010). The narrative of
crime emerging from that political climate consistently
and pointedly spoke of crime and justice in racial terms.
As Murakawa (2005) observes: “southern Democrats
opposed civil rights legislation in criminological terms,
arguing that forced racemixing breeds crime, that civil
rights legislation rewards black lawbreaking, and that
blacks are responsible for street crime” (81).
Linking crime with race and shifting the conversation
from social equality and development to criminal justice
and ‘law and order’ resulted in a dilution of the civil
rights argument, making it possible for the criminal-asenemy image to take hold. “The language of lawbreaking
relied on and promoted a social vision of individual
failure rooted in moral depravity” (Lerman and Weaver
2010, 55). This emerging narrative played on public fears
over personal safety, becoming a force of its own that
was politically unwise to confront. Thus, more liberal
political forces who supported integration and social
reforms became subsumed by the greater criminal justice
narrative. The political power of these socially constructed
narratives of crime is clarified by Boushey (2016), who
suggests that criminal justice policies are congruent with
“target population” typification, pressuring state and
local governments to “respond” to the crime issue with
increasingly punitive “law and order” policies (210-12).
Another powerful means of developing the common
narrative of crime and shaping public consciousness is
the media. Both through journalism (news) and popular
culture (such as film), the crime narrative has been
created and dramatized for optimal affect. The media has
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helped propel this new image of the criminal, described
as menacing, rogue, irredeemable, and most importantly
“other” — dark skinned and racially, ethnically, or
religiously different. Violent crime, being the most prone
to sensationalism, has firmly occupied the airwaves,
with the perpetrator nearly always African-American
(Beckett and Sasson 2004). In fact, in addition to getting
a larger share of coverage, Beckett and Sasson (2004)
found African-Americans were “depicted differently”
than white defendants, often as perpetrators of violent
crime, pictured “in the physical custody of police” and
not named, using instead terms such as “suspect” or
“perpetrator” (79). By contrast, the victims of violent
crime often are represented as white and female in direct
contradiction to every statistical trend on violent crime in
the United States, the overwhelming majority of whose
victims are black and male (Beckett and Sasson 2004).
A more recent study conducted in 2014 for “The
Sentencing Project,” indicates that these racially
distorted depictions persist despite increased awareness
of their fallacy and consequences (Ghandnoosh 2014).
Surveys cited in the study show that white respondents
overestimated minority criminality by 20 to 30 percent
and were more likely to view blacks and Latinos as “more
prone to violence” (Ghandnoosh 2014, 13). The rhetorical
power of these portrayals and terminology cannot and
should not be underestimated. White fear of black crime
is an essential political construct borne out of the throes
of the segregationist American South and cultivated by
the media. The “atypical” reporting and representation of
the perpetrators and victims of crime is “not a product
of how representative or novel a crime is,” Ghandnoosh
(2014) suggests, “but rather how well it can be ‘scripted
using stereotypes grounded in White racism and White
fear of Black crime’” (Lundman quoted in Ghandnoosh
2014, 23). This discursive, stereotypical loop selfsubstantiates by presenting and subsequently reinforcing
a particular narrative of crime. Beckett and Sasson
(2004) observe that the same narrative is extended into
popular culture in movies, TV dramas, and reality-based
programming, further cementing the latter. The result is
not only a distorted representation of violence, but a lack
of recognition of the disparate minority experiences with
the justice system compared to whites (see Figure 2).
Similar to the statistical trends of public opinion
regarding crime, Beckett and Sasson (2004) demonstrate
an incongruence between coverage of crime and actual
crime incidence rates. For example, over a period of five
years starting in 1990 when crime rates, particularly
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/urj/vol11/iss2/5

Figure 2. Source: Ghandnoosh (2014)
homicides and violent crime, had fallen by over ten
percentage points, “television and newspaper coverage
of crime increased by more than 400%... [and] network
news coverage of murder… increased by 336%” (Beckett
and Sasson 2004). Scholarship abound about the
“manufacturing” (Surette 2006) of crime “waves” and
crime “surges” (See Himmelstein 2014; Kappeler and
Potter 2014; Miller, Potter, and Kappeler 2006). Instead
of being rooted in reality, there is a divergence between
crime incidence and its reporting, thereby creating the
presumption of a crisis in the absence of it.
Beckett and Sasson (2004) go further: beyond being a
conduit for transmission of the crime narrative, “Under
some circumstances, media personnel may also play
a direct-role in the policy making process” (87). They
cite early research by criminologist Mark Fishman who
chronicled one such “crime wave” of purported violence
against the elderly, even though no specific increases
in crime against the elderly had actually occurred.
Nevertheless, the media campaign at the time resulted in
“the creation of new law enforcement squads and tactics,
the reallocation of public and police resources, and
the introduction of legislation aimed at protecting the
elderly” (Beckett and Sasson 2004, 87). It is no surprise
that the public is receptive to such sensational stories
of crime — the anomalous and rare event — and this
insidious power is deserving of more scholarly attention.
Law enforcement itself is hardly immune to the popular

www.URJ.ucf.edu

48

10

Hassan: The Politicization of Crime and its Implications

THE PEGASUS REVIEW:

11.2: 39-53

UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL

narrative of crime. Officers and agents are, after all,
members of society exposed to the same narratives
and the same information as anyone else in the public.
Though their specialization may afford them access to
sources of information not readily (if at all) available to
the public, this information is not part of the average
officer’s repertoire, and even then requires analysis
and interpretation to produce meaningful conclusions
(Maguire and Uchida 2000). Some effort is put into
re-aligning faulty assumptions in the training process
(Eterno 2007). This is particularly true of larger law
enforcement agencies with police academies and
substantial funding, a category to which a vast majority
of law enforcement agencies do not belong; however, the
fundamental assumptions about crime and criminality
remain the same.
Incorporating this crime narrative into law enforcement
has significant consequences, not only on individual
perceptions, but in enacting these latent assumptions
in society. Increased scrutiny by law enforcement of
specific target populations inevitably leads to reduced
scrutiny of other areas and populations (Michalowski
2000). In those areas of high scrutiny and contact with
law enforcement, there is a much higher likelihood of
uncovering incidence, and the converse is also true. Those
who experience low contact with law enforcement are
not represented in criminal populations by virtue of that
decreased scrutiny. This trend is not necessarily a result of
a lower rate of criminality overall, therefore perpetuating
the common narrative of certain populations being
more readily disposed to violence than others (Reiman
1984). In essence, the crime narrative has become a selffulfilling prophecy of national proportions.

agencies taxed with protecting the public, ensuring safety,
and repelling deviance do so with a distorted mandate.
The law enforcement apparatus continues to operate
under an outdated narrative of the actors and agents of
crime and criminality, unnecessarily racializing police
activities and creating a dichotomy of confrontation.
The federalization of law enforcement subsumed its
professionalization, negatively influencing the localized
strategy and responsiveness needed to effectively police
and serve communities, while reducing the positive
effect of professionalization. It has also facilitated the
politicization of crime and given outsize power to
politics and politicians over crime control.
So long as politics remains the central animating force
in crime control, truly effective mechanisms for law
enforcement and a fair and just system will remain elusive.
However, there are signs of a positive shift. Growing
public awareness and a reformist wave in political and
institutional rhetoric suggests that a more effective and
equal system of crime control may yet be possible. Uggen
and Larson (2017) state that “the public is making halting
but steady progress toward becoming smarter, rather than
tougher, on crime.” Recognizing the inherent fallacies of
the crime narrative and the politicized shaping of law
enforcement, which this research has attempted to do,
is a step in the right direction. Further research in this
area and on the means and mechanisms of reform and
reevaluation is needed to discover viable solutions.

CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the skewed narrative and continued
ambiguity around crime, its origins, and effective ways
of deterring it serves political purposes. Matters of
personal security carry the greatest potential for impact
on individuals, touching on the innate desire for selfpreservation. Politicizing crime allows politicians and
policy makers to tap into this powerful driver for shortterm political gain. We continue to see that phenomenon
today with school shootings and the gun control debate
(Lloyd 2016), the opioid crisis and the ongoing drug war
(Rodriguez 2018), and varied manifestations of the War
on Terror (Mancino 2016). Meanwhile, the true factors
of crime in society, and potential solutions, are given little
attention. Worse still, the mechanisms, institutions, and
Published by STARS, 2020
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Percentage (and rank order) of those responding "crime" of crime combined with such related matters as
"lawlessness", "law enforcement", "juvenile delinquency", and "immorality."

Source: Scheingold (1984)
Table 2: Political salience of crime: Forced-Choice Questions

Source: Scheingold (1984)
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